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Abstract
Foreign stock ownership is known to be very limited across households. This paper studies the
role of information acquisition on agents￿decisions to invest in foreign stocks. Using the Survey
of Consumer Finances, I show that foreign stock holders, when compared to those who hold only
domestic stocks, are substantially wealthier, more educated, have a di⁄erent age pro￿le, and more
importantly, are more sophisticated in their sources of information. Households that participate
in foreign stock markets are better informed about their ￿nancial investment choices; they shop
more for investments, update their investment portfolios more frequently, and use the Internet more
often as a source of information. To account for the two main features of the data ￿that foreign
stock owners are scarce but better-informed ￿ the paper considers a model where information is
costly, and investors decide whether to enter the domestic and foreign stock markets. In the model,
investors pay a ￿xed cost to update their information set, implying infrequent updating. To account
for the low participation, the model also features an entry cost paid when agents ￿rst invest in
stocks. The model predicts that those who invest in foreign stocks update their information set more
frequently. A version of the model calibrated to match returns and volatility for U.S. and foreign
stock investments shows that, once agents already invest in domestic stock markets, the minimum
entry cost needed to drive agents out of foreign stock markets is potentially small helping to explain
the large nonparticipation.
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11 Introduction
One of the main puzzles in the household ￿nance literature is the so-called participation puzzle: a large
fraction of the population does not participate in the stock market. It is also puzzling that a much
greater share of households do not participate in foreign stock markets, despite the well-known gains
from keeping a diversi￿ed portfolio of assets.1 While substantial normative and positive analysis has
tried to explain what drivers household holdings of domestic stocks, the knowledge about household
holdings of foreign stocks is more limited. On the one hand, the household ￿nance literature describes
the decision to invest in stocks as a two-step process, in which households ￿rst decide whether to enter
the stock market and subsequently decide on the share of assets to hold in their portfolios. On the other
hand, the international ￿nance literature has focused on the share of foreign assets households hold in
their portfolios, documenting a large home bias on households￿portfolio holdings. However, preceding
investors￿choice of the share of foreign assets to hold is the decision on whether to own foreign assets,
in particular, foreign stocks. While the recent international ￿nance literature points toward the role of
information in explaining agents￿share of foreign assets (e.g., Veldkamp and Van Nieuwerburgh (2010)
and Mondria and Wu (2010)), I move one step back and look at the role of information in explaining the
￿rst step, i.e., the decision to enter the foreign stock market. Is there a role for information acquisition
in the entry decision? Are foreign stock holders more attentive?
To study the role of information acquisition on investors￿decisions, the paper provides an empirical
analysis of agents￿ownership of foreign stocks and compares the ownership decision for foreign and
domestic stocks. The data show that holders of foreign stocks are somewhat di⁄erent from holders of
domestic ones, being more sophisticated in their information acquisition process and more attentive.
Driven by these results, the paper presents a model that accounts for the two main features of the data:
low participation in foreign stock markets and information acquisition.
Using the Survey of Consumer Finances I disentangle direct holders of foreign and domestic stocks,
i.e., households that hold individual stocks outside of investment funds mainly through brokers and
banks. I follow the participation puzzle literature and ￿rst focus on the e⁄ects of wealth, age, and
education on participation. For both asset classes ￿foreign and domestic ￿participation increases with
the level of wealth. Foreign stocks holders are largely concentrated at the highest wealth percentiles,
while the share of domestic stock holders is spread across percentiles of wealth. As for the age pro￿le,
the documented hump shape over age intervals does not appear when the sample is restricted to holdings
of foreign stocks. In line with the equity holdings literature, having more years of schooling increases
participation in both asset classes, and households whose head has at least a college degree diversify their
portfolio more. The data also detail various ￿nancial, non￿nancial, and demographic characteristics.
Compared to households who hold domestic stocks only, foreign stock investors have higher incomes,
￿nancial, real estate, and business wealths. Foreign stock holders also have larger debt levels. Among
the demographic characteristics, the data highlight that foreign stock investors report themselves to be
1For a review of the literature on participation puzzle see Campbell (2006) and Lewis (1999).
2more willing to take ￿nancial risks than investors that hold domestic stocks only. Finally, and more
importantly for this paper, foreign stock holders are better informed regarding their ￿nancial choices:
they shop more for investments, talk more frequently to their brokers, and use the Internet more often
as a main source of information.
The regression estimates con￿rm the unconditional analysis. The benchmark regressions estimate
probability models (probit regressions) on the ownership of foreign and domestic stocks. The results
reinforce that foreign stock investors are distinct from those who hold domestic stocks only (and from
households who hold stocks through investment funds). Holders of foreign stocks are more sophisticated
in their information acquisition process; using the Internet as the main source of information has a
positive and statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect for holdings of foreign stocks, while the same does not hold
true for domestic holders. The regressions also highlight the role of risk aversion by showing a negative
correlation between ownership and willingness to take risk. In addition, having a college degree correlates
positively with ownership as expected, adding to the inference on the role of information. Finally,
the regressions point to the role of background risks arising from other investments, by showing that
households with larger private business wealth have a smaller probability of holding any type of stocks.
The robustness checks highlight the role of wealth on agents￿stock holdings and show evidence of a joint
ownership decision. In addition, the regression results are robust to di⁄erent estimation techniques and
di⁄erent informational variable choices.
The main limitation of the Survey of Consumer Finances is the lack of detailed information about
indirect stock ownership. Although the Survey inquires both about stocks held directly and through
investment funds, the questionnaire does not discriminate between holdings of domestic and foreign
stocks held through investment funds, and hence this paper focuses on direct holders of stocks. The
data show that a little less than 3% of agents hold foreign stocks directly in their portfolio. This same
￿gure stays near 17% when looking at domestic stock holders.2 While this data limitation constrains my
analysis, it is potentially a good source for inference on household choice of investments, since for direct
holdings there is no portfolio manager making the decision for the household. Nevertheless, to overcome
the data limitation, I turn to the various reports provided by the Investment Company Institute, which
tracks the investment fund industry in the United States. These reports reinforce the results obtained
from the Survey of Consumer Finances.3
The data analysis shows that for given set of demographic characteristics, foreign stock holders
are more attentive. To capture this feature, this paper presents a model where agents can invest in
both domestic and foreign stocks. I depart from the Abel et al. (2007) model by introducing foreign
stocks as an additional risky asset. In the model, consumers can invest in both domestic and foreign
2I complement the analysis by also looking at the estimation results for indirect holdings of stocks and overall equity
holdings using the aggregate measure provided in the Survey of Consumer Finances. The data show that around 46% of
households hold stocks through investment funds (indirect holdings) and the percentage of holders of equity (both directly
and indirectly) reaches 50%.
3The absence of information about foreign stocks held through investment funds also precludes an analysis about
the share of foreign assets held, therefore, this paper focuses only on the participation decision, and does not study the
well-known home bias on agents portfolio of assets. For a survey on home bias, see Lewis (1999).
3stocks and pay an "observation cost" to update their portfolios, which implies that they optimally
choose to do so infrequently. To account for the large share of the population that is out of the
stock market, I also introduce a one-time entry cost to be paid when investors ￿rst enter the stock
market. This cost represents ￿nancial costs and time spent learning about investment opportunities
and acquiring information about risks and returns. The model shows that agents who invest in foreign
stocks are more attentive, updating their portfolios more frequently. Intuitively, although it is costly
to obtain information, once increasing the overall share of stocks in their total portfolio, risk averse
agents gain from diversi￿cation but also face larger risks, and hence, they update their information
set more frequently. After calibrating the model to match returns and volatility for the U.S. economy
and several foreign stock investments, I assess the minimum cost that would drive investors out of the
foreign market once they have already invested in domestic stocks. The calibrated model predicts that
this minimum cost is potentially small and decreasing in risk aversion and updating costs. Variations
on risk aversion or uncertainty about foreign stock returns can make this minimum entry cost fairly
small to justify the large nonparticipation in foreign stock markets.
This paper relates to the literature on household￿portfolios and the participation puzzle. The
latter literature is vast, with a substantial documentation and analysis of household portfolios available
in Guiso et al. (2002) and a summary by Campbell (2006). A highly studied reason for such low
participation is participation costs, but the literature shows that participation costs alone are not enough
to account for the large fraction of the population that remains out of the stock market. Vissing-
Jorgensen (2003) and Attanasio and Vissing-Jorgensen (2003) explore the role of transaction costs,
participation costs, and large risk aversion; Curcuru et al. (2009) introduce a short-sale constraint as
an additional source of limitation to participation. Recent papers incorporate information as one factor
that drives participation in stock markets. Abel et al. (2007) introduce an information update cost
into investor problems; Alvarez et al. (2010) look at the e⁄ects of introducing consumption of durable
goods on agents; Veldkamp and Van Nieuwerburgh (2010) look at the optimal amount of information
needed to acquire; and Huang and Liu (2007) assume that agents can extract a signal from asset returns
and analyze how information processing a⁄ects their portfolio decisions. Finally, this work also relates
to the classic papers such as Merton (1969, 1971; and 1973) and Samuelson (1969), where agents take
positions in all assets available and the portfolio shares are constant over the life cycle. It also relates to
Baumol (1952) and Miller and Orr (1966) who look at the e⁄ects of transaction costs in cash-in-advance
models (in their model, consumers hold cash to ￿nance consumption between updating periods, when
they remain inactive).
Section 2 presents the data and unconditional analysis about household holdings of stocks. Section
3 shows the regression estimates, followed by robustness results in Section 4. The model is described in
Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
42 The Data
As surveyed in Campbell (2006), the ideal data set should have ￿ve main characteristics: (i) cover a
representative sample; (ii) measure both total wealth and its complete breakdown in relevant categories;
(iii) be disaggregated enough to distinguish among main assets; (iv) be highly accurate; and (v) follow
households over their life.
The Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), conducted by the Federal Reserve Board, ful￿lls the ￿rst
two properties. It consists of a triennial household survey on asset holdings in the United States. In
most recent years, the survey interviews 3000 households randomly selected and some additional 1500
high-wealth households selected from tax records. Since most ￿nancial and non￿nancial assets are
held by wealthier individuals, this oversampling of wealthier households allows for a better description
of household portfolios. The sampling characteristics of the SCF makes survey weights important to
uncover statistics for the U.S. population. Throughout this paper, all data and statistics from the SCF
are weighted.
Besides covering a large enough sample, information provided by the SCF is vast and covers most
aspects of household wealth, asset holdings, and liabilities.4 The SCF, however, is not a panel but a
cross-section of randomly selected individuals every three years. For this paper, the data set consists of
the SCF for years 1998, 2001, 2004, and 2007, resulting in a sample of 17;684 households.
Measurement errors and accuracy are a common worry of survey data, and the SCF is no exception.5
To deal with measurement errors, the SCF implements an imputation method, where each response is
replicated ￿ve times in the system. In addition, the large and detailed questionnaire allows for numerous
cross-checks of the answers provided by households.6
Although the level of information disaggregation in the SCF has increased over the past few years,
the survey still lacks enough information to address portfolio diversi￿cation, since it poorly addresses
holdings of individual assets. Most importantly for this paper, the survey does not distinguish between
holdings of foreign and domestic stocks through investment funds. In particular, the SCF explicitly asks
if agents hold individual foreign and/or domestic stocks in their portfolio (mostly through brokerage
accounts), in addition to inquiring about total holdings of stocks through investment funds. However, it
does not discriminate between indirect holdings of foreign and domestic stocks, inquiring only if agents
hold stocks through di⁄erent types of funds, but not if they hold one type and/or the other. Therefore,
detailed information on what may be a large part of agents￿portfolios is missing.7
4The estimates of wealth from the SCF tend to be 10% to 20% less than those obtained from the Flow of Funds
Accounts (FFA). This di⁄erence can be attributed to: (1) underreporting; (2) to the exclusion of some items from the
Survey that are accounted for in the FFA, such as durable goods other than vehicles; or (3) to the fact that individuals at
the very top of the wealth distribution are not included. In Antoniewicz (1996), after adjusting for the di⁄erences between
the SCF and the FFA, the estimates tend to be somewhat similar.
5Kennickell (1998) reports that the refusal rates in 1995 were substantial and especially large for higher-wealth indi-
viduals. In addition, numerous households refused to provide dollar values for their assets or only reported ranges when
asked about the dollar amount of their investments.
6For more details on this method and on its implications for the results of this paper, see footnote 33.
7In addition to jeopardizing a complete analysis of household participation decisions, this missing information precludes
5In trying to brie￿ y address this de￿ciency, this paper also relies on information provided by the
Investment Company Institute (ICI). The ICI is a national association of U.S. investment companies
including mutual funds, closed-end funds, exchange traded funds, and unit investment trusts. They
produce a series of reports on recent developments in the investment fund industry, in addition to
sporadic surveys among investors. I use their publications as a secondary source of information for
indirect holdings of foreign assets.
While the SCF covers a large enough share of the population, the ICI reports only include the
universe of holders of these assets, and hence, the latter does not allow one to analyze participation
decisions. The size of the sample of investors is also limited, raising concerns about data representa-
tiveness. Nevertheless, the ICI data and reports provide an interesting summary of the recent trends in
indirect stock ownership, signaling a signi￿cant increase in holdings of foreign stocks through investment
funds. In addition, their reports corroborate the ￿ndings regarding direct ownership from the SCF.
2.1 Household Finances - Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances
The literature relies on three main variables to control for di⁄erences across stocks investors; wealth, age,
and education. For these same variables, the asset-holding literature documents with little divergence
three facts about equity ownership. Participation in equity markets is (i) increasing in wealth,8 (ii)
increasing in education,9 and (iii) hump-shaped in age.10
Wealth is important since wealthier agents hold most of the assets available in the economy and thus,
most of the action happens for this group. Age is related to life-cycle behavior and hence, one expects
di⁄erences in holdings of assets for each age interval. Finally, education is a proxy for information and
more informed agents are expected to better diversify their portfolio. This set of facts is shown to be
robust to controlling for other variables, and also robust to di⁄erent countries.
As shown by previous empirical works (e.g., Bertaut and Starr-McCluer (1995) and Calvet, Camp-
bell, and Sodini (2007)), the recent increase in stock market participation is widely spread across
di⁄erent countries. Technological innovations and the greater liberalization and integration of ￿nancial
markets have brought more attention to the availability of di⁄erent types of assets, in particular, foreign
stocks. Across countries, agents have increased their participation in stock markets and also the degree
of diversi￿cation in their portfolios. Hence, this Section starts by documenting the recent trends for
holdings of foreign and domestic stocks. Subsequently, I examine other variables that determine direct
holdings of stocks, in particular foreign ones.
My main goal is to describe household stock portfolios, focusing on ownership decisions in domestic
and foreign stock markets.11 For each table and ￿gure, I focus my analysis on two main variables: direct
one from addressing the well-known home bias in agents￿portfolios.
8Bertaut and Starr-McCluer (2002).
9Guiso and Jappelli (2005).
10See Ameriks and Zeldes (2004) for more about age e⁄ects.
11While the spotlight is on the ownership decision, the Appendix also provides some information about the share of
assets held on agents portfolio to allow for comparison to the equity holdings literature.
6holdings of foreign stocks and direct holdings of domestic stocks. I also add information about indirect
holdings of stocks through investment and retirement funds. Finally, to make my results comparable
to the participation puzzle literature, I report statistics for overall equity holdings. Because this data
set compiles quite disaggregated measures of di⁄erent types of liquid and illiquid assets, I follow the
guidelines of the Federal Reserve Board publications and codes to build aggregate measures, such as
total equity holdings, total wealth, and income.12
Table 1 presents participation and the mean invested for four classes of assets: direct holdings
of foreign stocks, direct holdings of domestic stocks, indirect holdings of stocks, and equity holdings.
Foreign and Domestic correspond to direct holdings of foreign and domestic stocks outside investment
funds, respectively. Foreign stock holders are those who answered positively to the question, ￿Among
your direct holdings of stocks, do you have stocks from a company headquartered outside the United
States?￿ . Domestic refers to agents who hold only domestic stocks outside investment funds, and do
not hold individual foreign stocks. To build the Domestic sample, I exclude from direct holders of stocks
those who answered positively to the question about holdings of stocks from a company headquartered
outside the United States. In principle, those two sets of investors can also hold domestic stocks or foreign
stocks through investment funds.13 Indirect corresponds to holdings of both domestic and foreign stocks
through investment funds and retirement accounts. I choose not to exclude direct holders from those who
own stocks indirectly, hence, those who own stocks indirectly can also be direct owners.14 Finally, Equity
is an aggregate measure of stocks holdings that includes both direct and indirect holdings of domestic and
foreign stocks (which is the usual measure reported in the participation puzzle literature). Throughout
the paper, Participation refers to the percentage of households out of the population (weighted data)
holding the asset.
Rows (1) and (5) of Table 1 con￿rm previous ￿ndings in the participation puzzle literature by
showing that participation in equity markets have increased substantially since 1998. The large increase
in participation in equity markets across the ￿rst triennium reported in Table 1 is followed by an almost
stable rate of participation in the following years. Row (2) indicates that the bulk of the increase in
participation comes from indirect holdings of stocks. There is a steep increase in indirect holdings of
stocks but a relatively less-pronounced increase in direct holdings (rows (3) + (4)). Participation in
domestic stock markets ranges from 14% to 15%, peaking in 2001 at 19%.
Participation in foreign markets is limited for all years, and from 2001 onwards, the percentage of
people holding foreign stocks increased only slightly. At odds with the pattern of the previous years,
12The code to build aggregate measures is available on the Survey of Consumer Finance website:
http://www.federalreserve.gov/PUBS/oss/oss2/bulletin.macro.txt
13The SCF does not distinguish whether holders of foreign stocks are also holders of domestic ones. The ICI data set,
however, indicates that this is indeed the case, and roughly every investor who holds foreign stocks directly also holds
domestic ones, both directly and indirectly.
14To build this measure, I follow the guidelines of the Federal Reserve Board publications and codes. Households
are asked if they own stocks among their holdings of investment funds. They are then asked if their portfolio for
each type of investment fund is composed of mostly stocks, bonds, or split in both types of investment, and about
the share invested in bonds and stocks. The Board considers that 50% of the portfolio is held in stocks when agents
report holdings funds split between bonds and stocks. For more detailed information in building such a measure, see
http://www.federalreserve.gov/PUBS/oss/oss2/bulletin.macro.txt.
7Table 1: Participation and mean holdings for di⁄erent asset classes
1998 2001 2004 2007
Participationa
(1) Equity 48.87 52.26 50.22 51.12
(2) Indirect 44.21 48.27 46.15 46.86
(3) Domestic 17.00 18.99 18.27 15.07
(4) Foreign 2.21 2.32 2.38 2.83
Mean Holdingsb
(5) Equity 3,085.4 3,416.8 3,436.8 4,763.6
(6) Indirect 984.4 1,044.2 1,320.8 2,214.6
(7) Domestic 3,271.3 2,839.0 2,892.3 3,670.1
(8) Foreign 869,0 1,611.3 895.5 1,490.6
aFraction of population holding the asset.
bConditional on holding (in 2007 thousand dollars).
however, in 2007 participation in foreign stock markets increased, while the same ￿gure for domestic
stocks diminished. There is also a small increase in indirect holdings of stocks. As Section 2.2 will show,
ICI data indicate that the same pattern is true for indirect holdings of foreign versus domestic stocks;
i.e., holdings of foreign stocks through investment funds increased substantially over this period, while
after 2005 holdings of domestic stocks dropped.
The second half of Table 1 show to the mean value of holdings of each type of asset conditional on
holding the asset in 2007 thousand dollars. Rows (5) to (8) show that for all classes of assets, there is
a sharp increase in mean holdings. Row (8) shows that the increase in participation in foreign markets
is followed by an increase in average holdings of this same asset. As a general statement, however, for
all years documented, both participation and mean holdings are much smaller for foreign stocks than
domestic ones.15
2.1.1 Participation and asset allocation by wealth
Figure 1 shows household ownership of each asset class across wealth percentiles.16 Wealth is measured
as household total assets in 2007 dollars,17 and participation refers to the percentage of households
holding the asset. Figure 1 shows that participation is increasing in wealth for all di⁄erent asset classes.
In addition, for all years, participation in foreign stocks is much smaller than other asset classes and
much more concentrated among the wealthiest percentiles. While participation in stock markets through
investment funds start to be positive around the 10th percentile of the wealth distribution, participation
in direct holdings of domestic stocks is more prominent around the 30th percentile of wealth and has
slightly increased over the past few years for households in the higher end of the wealth distribution.
Participation in foreign assets only increases at the highest 10th percentile of the wealth distribution.
Despite being much smaller than any other asset class, ownership of foreign assets has increased over
the past few years and peaked in 2007 for the top 10 wealth percentile.
15Tables 11 and 12 in the Appendix provide complementary information on recent developments of household ￿nancial
and non￿nancial assets.
16Analogous information about the share of assets in household portfolios is provided in the Appendix.





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































10As a general remark, for all di⁄erent wealth percentiles, when directly comparing data from 1998
and 2007, there is an increase in participation in indirect and foreign stock markets, while the same is
not true for direct holdings of domestic stocks. These changes suggest that over time the composition
of stock owners in the population has changed. A larger fraction of the population is participating in
the stock market, and agents from di⁄erent wealth levels compose the market. The auxiliary Figure 2
reorganizes the information in Figure 1 to help visualize these time trends.










































































































































































Equity Indirect Domestic Foreign
Figure 3: Household Asset Ownership by Age
The life-cycle theory applied to asset holdings predicts that households increase their holdings of
equity over their lifetimes until closer to retirement age, when equity holdings start to decrease. Hence,
it is common in the stock-holding literature to document that ownership is hump-shaped across age
intervals. Figure 3 shows this hump shape for equity and indirect holdings. This pattern is less evident,
however, for direct holdings of domestic and foreign stocks. In addition, participation in domestic
and foreign stock markets tend to peak after equity holdings, suggesting that agents start entering the
stock market by experimenting through funds and then migrating to direct holdings.18 The comparison
18Since the SCF is not a panel, it is not possible to keep track of households portfolio over their lifetime, and hence,
we cannot access the information on whether agents start experimenting with funds and move towards direct holdings.
However, as described in Subsection 2.2, the ICI surveys indicate that agents start investing in stocks through funds and
11between domestic and foreign holdings, however, does not give the same clear pattern.19 Besides, for
most years, participation in foreign stock markets peaks after domestic holdings of stocks.
2.1.3 Participation and asset allocation by education
Education is a good proxy for information. Households with more years of schooling tend to be more
informed, and if information is the variable precluding agents from taking advantage of the opportunities
in the stock market, the higher the education level, the larger the participation rate in domestic and
foreign stock markets.
Table 2 shows how participation in stock markets varies with household head education level. The
￿rst and the fourth rows show the percentage of agents holding each of the four asset categories who
have less than high school education level. The second and the ￿fth rows show the analogous numbers
for those who have completed high school but have no college degree, and the third and last rows show
the results for those who have at least a college degree. For all di⁄erent years and types of assets, the
higher the education level, the larger the participation in the di⁄erent asset markets. Over the years,
there is an increase in participation for both direct and indirect holdings for household heads with at
least a high school diploma. More importantly, for foreign holdings, the increase in participation when
one moves from high school to college education is relatively larger than for the other types of assets.
The analogous is not necessarily true once one moves from no high school diploma to high school level.
Table 2: Household Asset Ownership by Education
1998 2001
Equity Indirect Domestic Foreign Equity Indirect Domestic Foreign
No High S. 17.86 15.55 4.69 0.34 16.24 13.51 5.28 0.32
High S. 45.76 40.64 14.4 1.41 47.62 43.45 14.08 1.52
College 68.95 63.84 27.04 4.37 76.06 71.43 32.69 4.46
2004 2007
Equity Indirect Domestic Foreign Equity Indirect Domestic Foreign
No High S. 14.32 11.96 4.56 0.09 18.67 17.65 3.15 0.74
High S. 43.93 40.24 12.95 1.47 43.8 38.78 11.03 1.21
College 72.8 67.54 30.8 4.5 74.17 69.8 25.81 5.97
*Percentage of households by highest degree attained.
2.1.4 Participation and allocation: ￿nancial and demographic variables
Tables 3 and 4 compare nonholders and holders of domestic and foreign stocks. Table 3 summarizes
household ￿nancial characteristics. For each year, this table reports the mean values of household
income, ￿nancial wealth, real estate wealth, business wealth, and debt for nonholders of stocks versus
direct holders of domestic and foreign stocks (mean values in 2007 thousand dollars).20
Stockholders have more income and larger ￿nancial, real estate, and business wealths. Their larger
indebtedness indicates that they also have more access to credit. Households who hold foreign stocks,
later migrating to direct holdings.
19In addition, participation in foreign stocks is much volatile with respect to age than domestic direct or indirect holdings
of stocks.
20See footnote 12 for information about how to build aggregate measures of wealth.
12however, are considerably wealthier than holders of solely domestic stocks. For all years, income,
￿nancial, real estate, and business wealths are much larger for agents who participate in the foreign
stock market. Throughout the years, the gap between domestic and foreign stock holders has shrunk
while it enlarged when comparing holders to nonholders. Nevertheless, for all measures of wealth,
the increase in mean values is very large when moving from domestic stock holdings to foreign stock
holdings. The debt level is also larger for foreign stock holders, although the gap is not as wide as for
the other variables.
Table 3: Stock Holders versus Nonholders - Financial Characteristics*
1998 2001
Nonholder Domestic Foreign Nonholder Domestic Foreign
Income 35.0 133.1 186.9 37.9 161.9 224.2
Fin. Wealth 29.7 506.9 1,239.4 33.4 618.5 1,454.5
RE Wealth 65.3 216.1 276.0 68.4 279.2 387.0
Bus. Wealth 21.9 211.2 445.6 23.0 221.5 421.0
Debt 29.2 110.9 111.0 29.7 113.7 151.9
2004 2007
Nonholder Domestic Foreign Nonholder Domestic Foreign
Income 37.6 145.4 214.9 38.9 159.6 294.3
Fin. Wealth 26.8 565.3 1,308.5 25.1 603.2 1,558.7
RE Wealth 90.1 356.7 500.1 99.7 409.0 558.3
Bus. Wealth 22.7 236.6 407.0 37.6 304.6 712.2
Debt 42.8 147.1 153.4 49.4 171.4 186.5
*Mean values of household wealth (in 2007 thousand dollars)
Table 4 complements Table 3 by presenting demographic characteristics of nonholders and holders
of stocks. The mean age of participants in foreign stock markets is higher than the mean age of
household heads who invest only in domestic stocks or are nonholders. The same is true for mean years
of education for all di⁄erent years, even though the di⁄erence between domestic and foreign holders is
not very large. While the percentage of married people is higher among domestic stock investors than
among nonholders, this share is smaller among foreign holders than for domestic ones.
Households are also asked how much risk they are willing to take on a scale from 1 (substantial
￿nancial risk) to 4 (no risk). For all years, participants in the stock market self-report as being less
averse to risk. Foreign stock holders are even less risk averse than domestic stock investors.
A ￿nal interesting variable is the percentage of Hispanic people across each category. As posed in
Lewis (1999), agents with foreign backgrounds could be more informed about foreign assets, and hence,
be more exposed to such investments. The share of the population that is descent of Hispanic, however,
shows no clear pattern when comparing holders of domestic and foreign stocks. As Section 3 will show,
when controlling for di⁄erent variables, being Hispanic actually decreases the probability of holding
foreign and domestic stocks directly.
Since the holders of stocks are mostly concentrated at the higher percentiles of the wealth dis-
tribution, I replicate Tables 3 and 4 while limiting my sample to the top 10 percent of the wealth
distribution.21 For this special group, it is still true that income and, ￿nancial and real estate wealth
are, in general, larger for holders of stocks than for non-holders, and again, much larger for those who
21These tables are presented in the Appendix as Tables 14 and 15.
13own foreign stocks. For business wealth, however, nonholders in the top 10% of the wealth distribution
have considerably more business wealth than holders of domestic stocks, suggesting that background
risks in￿ uence the decision to enter the stock market.22
Table 4: Stock Holders versus Non-holders - Demographic Characteristics
1998 2001
Nonholder Domestic Foreign Nonholder Domestic Foreign
Agea 49.48 50.62 52.65 50.37 49.88 54.87
Educationb 12.03 14.48 14.98 11.87 14.58 15.25
Hispanicc 11.12 2.42 3.07 11.94 2.81 1.24
Marriedc 48.47 72.79 60.80 48.56 74.76 76.90
Risk aversiond 3.44 2.66 2.46 3.51 2.64 2.63
2004 2007
Nonholder Domestic Foreign Nonholder Domestic Foreign
Agea 49.52 52.04 54.52 49.27 51.51 54.71
Educationb 12.14 14.78 15.35 12.15 14.85 15.51
Hispanicc 14.64 1.75 1.15 14.60 2.59 1.48
Marriedc 46.51 72.36 66.94 48.71 70.09 68.34
Risk aversiond 3.53 2.77 2.63 3.50 2.80 2.57
a Mean age of household heads
b Mean years of education of household heads
c Share of agents for each characteristic
d Self-reported willingness to take risk on a scale from 1(low) to 4(high)
2.1.5 Participation decision: informational variables
The SCF provides several proxies for household information acquisition when deciding on their invest-
ments. The data show that the main sources of information are quite di⁄erent for the di⁄erent types of
investors. Foreign stock holders appear to consult the Internet more frequently but also use newspapers
and brokers as major sources, while domestic stock holders and indirect holders often cite friends and
family as main sources of information. Table 5 provides the main sources of information for house-
holds when deciding about their investments. In particular, households are asked,￿What sources of
information do you (and your family) use to make decisions about saving and investments?￿Respon-
dents can list several sources, and Table 5 presents the percentage of households that cite each source.
As an example, in 2007, "Internet" is cited as a main source of information by 19% of nonholders of
stocks, 40% of holders of domestic stocks and 57% of holders of foreign stocks. In fact, the Internet is
consistently reported as a main source of information by holders of foreign stocks, indicating a higher
level of sophistication in their information acquisition process. Foreign holders also more frequently cite
newspapers, bankers, brokers, and ￿nancial planners as main sources.
Households are also asked about the amount of ￿Shop Around￿they do when making investment
22A positive relation between stock returns and returns to investment would imply that agents with higher business
wealth will tend to participate less in the domestic stock market. The opposite should be true if the relation between
business returns and foreign stocks is weak or negative. In fact, when restricting the sample to the top 10% of the wealth
distribution, the mean value of business wealth is larger for nonholders than for holders of stocks, but the di⁄erence between
these last two variables is smaller when comparing the mean value di⁄erence of foreign holders versus nonholders than
domestic holders versus nonholders. For evidence on these correlations and implications, see Heaton and Lucas (2000a,
2000b) and Baxter and Jermann (1997).
14Table 5: Stock Holders versus Nonholders - Main Sources of Information*
1998 2001
Nonholder Domestic Foreign Nonholder Domestic Foreign
Internet 4.26 15.18 24.32 7.96 26.43 29.20
Newspapers 13.08 30.67 43.29 11.52 24.74 34.83
Call Around 21.73 19.87 13.53 19.47 17.30 15.70
Friends/Relatives 35.38 39.12 26.52 33.46 35.34 37.75
Banker 25.80 22.29 18.88 28.42 22.50 29.52
Broker 4.29 22.08 40.98 4.37 28.08 31.99
Fin. Planner 8.71 28.40 36.44 9.53 25.28 24.62
2004 2007
Nonholder Domestic Foreign Nonholder Domestic Foreign
Internet 12.20 30.42 35.64 19.19 39.67 57.32
Newspapers 12.39 25.30 27.79 13.17 25.93 34.05
Call Around 17.83 14.68 21.28 18.16 18.49 16.68
Friends/Relatives 33.07 34.18 37.39 39.30 40.13 41.73
Banker 26.26 26.60 20.50 32.83 28.69 31.82
Broker 3.76 23.18 27.66 4.95 20.12 34.26
Fin. Planner 9.22 28.07 32.73 10.36 30.91 31.90
*Percentage of households that cite each item as a main source of information
decisions in a scale from 1 (almost no shopping) to 5 (a great deal of shopping). Table 6 shows that,
once more, the same pattern follows: foreign stock holders shop around the most, followed by domestic
investors and nonholders. Households report the number of times they talked to their broker within
the year, answering the question: ￿Over the past year, about how many times did you buy or sell stocks
or other securities through a broker?￿The mean number of times is reported by the variable ￿Times￿
in Table 6, showing that holders of foreign assets trade substantially more often than nonholders and
holders of domestic stocks only.23 Households also report the number of ￿nancial institutions in which
they have accounts: ￿With how many ￿nancial institutions do you currently have accounts or loans, or
regularly do personal ￿nancial business? Include banks, savings and loans, credit unions, brokerages, loan
companies, and so forth, but not institutions where you have only credit cards or business accounts.￿
Households that hold foreign stocks also have accounts in a larger number of institutions (variable
￿Institutions￿ ). Finally, households that hold stocks directly, most frequently do so though brokerage
accounts. Besides answering about holding a brokerage account, they are also asked: ￿Do you have a
￿ cash￿or ￿ call money￿account at a stock brokerage?￿This would include agents who used to have a
broker to invest in stock market and still keep a brokerage account, but are not currently an investor.
The Table shows that the share of agents that hold these accounts is larger for foreign holders than for
domestic holders or nonholders (variable ￿Brokerage Acc.￿ ).
To close this descriptive section, some other variables which are not reported in Tables 1-6 are still
worth noting. Households who invest in stocks directly target longer term investments and savings
more frequently. In particular, among foreign stock holders, a higher percentage of households have
a investment time frame of 10 years or more while domestic stock holders have a smaller time frame.
Foreign stock holders also gain more often with their investments and lose less often. The magnitude
of gains is at least twice as much as for households who have foreign stocks than for agents who only
23Some nonholders of stocks also report talking to their broker as a source of information in their investment decisions,
but opt not to hold this type of investments.
15Table 6: Stock Holders versus Nonholders - Information Acquisition Variables
1998 2001
Nonholder Domestic Foreign Nonholder Domestic Foreign
Shop Arounda 2.60 3.37 3.57 2.67 3.17 3.37
Timesb 3.10 8.45 11.35 4.59 9.70 15.68
Institutionsc 2.24 4.95 5.71 2.06 4.83 5.97
Brokerage Acc.d 1.78 8.87 16.83 1.79 11.51 20.35
2004 2007
Nonholder Domestic Foreign Nonholder Domestic Foreign
Shop Around 2.78 3.15 3.46 2.74 3.19 3.29
Times 7.50 7.66 9.59 1.87 7.27 17.12
Institutions 2.24 4.86 5.75 2.32 4.67 5.33
Brokerage Acc. 1.34 9.73 19.51 1.15 7.00 21.36
aMean self-reported degree of shopping for investments on a scale from 1 (low) to 4 (high).
bMean number of times households traded last year.
cMean number of ￿nancial institutions.
dMean share of agents who hold a cash account at a brokerage.
hold domestic. Losses tend to be only slightly larger for holders of foreign than for households who hold
only domestic stocks directly.
As for reasons for investing, agents are more similar. The two most cited reasons for investing are
"for retirement" and for "rainy days" irrespective of the year or portfolio decision.
Finally, for the statistics presented above, I am looking at unconditional probabilities. It is also
interesting to look at some cross-conditional probabilities. Among direct holders of stocks, the percent-
age of households who also hold foreign stocks ranges from 12% in 1998 to 15% in 2007.24 Moreover,
households who hold foreign stocks directly are also indirect holders of stocks. The percentage of agents
holding stocks indirectly given that they directly hold foreign stocks ranges from 83% in 1998 to 90%
in 2004 and 84% in 2007. The share of agents who hold stocks indirectly given that they only hold
domestic stocks is smaller, ranging from 75% to 80% across the di⁄erent years.
Holding foreign assets is important for diversi￿cation. The previous tables suggest that agents are
underdiversifying quite signi￿cantly with respect to foreign holdings. This interpretation should be
taken with caution, since the SCF has only detailed information about direct holdings of foreign assets.
Households could be diversifying by holding mutual funds that invest in foreign assets, which is not
captured in the aggregate measure for funds reported in the Survey of Consumer of Finances. Hence,
in the next subsection, I look at a di⁄erent data source to infer about indirect holdings.
2.2 Indirect Holdings - Evidence from the Investment Company Institute
The Investment Company Institute (ICI) is a national association of U.S. investment companies, includ-
ing mutual funds, closed-end funds, exchange traded funds, and unit investment trusts. It provides a
series of reports covering recent trends for investment funds, in addition to producing sporadic surveys
among investors. As of 2007, investment companies managed $13 trillion in assets for 90 million U.S.
investors.
24As Section 2.2 will show, these participation shares are consistent with reports from the ICI.
16A recent survey conducted jointly by the ICI and the Securities Industry Association shows that,
while the direct ownership of foreign stocks has not largely increased since 1999, the percentage of
stock mutual fund investors owning international funds has increased substantially. The survey shows
that among individual stock investors, 15% held foreign stocks directly in 1999, 18% in 2002, and 21%
in 2005.25 Among mutual fund investors, the percentage of investors who held Global (International)
Mutual Funds is 62% in 1999, 56% in 2002 and 65% in 2005.26
In addition, the 2009 Investment Company Fact Book shows that the share of household assets held
in investment companies has increased steadily since 1990, ranging from 8% of agents ￿nancial assets
in 1990 to 23% in 2007, although dropping to 19% in 2008. For 2006 and 2007, in particular, there is
a steep increase of in￿ ows to stock mutual funds. The bulk of this increase is led by investments in
international mutual funds, when for the ￿rst time, domestic funds experienced a net out￿ ow. This same
pattern of investment ￿ ows veri￿es among the other di⁄erent types of funds that the ICI tracks.27;28
Recall that Table 1 con￿rms this trend by showing an increase in direct holdings of foreign stocks and
a decrease in domestic stocks in 2007.
Regarding the role of information on investors￿portfolio choices, a recent ICI publication, ￿Equity
and Bond Ownership in America 2008,￿ reveals that around 65% of investors start their ￿nancial
investments in stock markets through the purchase of investment funds, and then migrate to individual
stock holdings. In addition, concerning Internet usage, an ICI survey among mutual fund holders reports
that since 2006, 90% of mutual fund investors have Internet access. In addition, in 2009, 82% of these
investors used the Internet to manage ￿nancial investments or obtain information about investment
opportunities. This latter number drops to 60% for nonholders of mutual funds.29
3 Econometric Analysis
In this Section, I follow the participation puzzle literature and look at the same four asset classes
while controlling for a set of variables. For each regression, I pool the data from 1998, 2001, 2004 and
2007 resulting in a sample of 17;684 households, from which 10;901 hold equity directly or indirectly
(￿Equity￿ ), 9;933 hold indirectly (￿Indirect￿ ), 4;591 hold domestic stocks directly (￿Domestic￿ ), and
1;183 hold foreign stocks (￿Foreign￿ ). Subsequently, I estimate probit regressions for the four classes of
assets above, where the dependent variable in all four regressions corresponds to a categorical variable
valued one if the household owns the asset and zero otherwise.30
25Despite the limited sample, statistics that emerge from the ICI seem consistent with the SCF. Regarding foreign stock
ownership, for example, according to the ICI, in 1999, 15% of individual stock investors held foreign stocks. Table 1 shows
that according to the SCF, in 1998, 12% of individual stock investors held foreign stocks (
2%
2%+17%).
26The survey, Equity Ownership in America, was conducted in the ￿rst quarter of 2005 with 2414 equity investors
(de￿ned as owners of any type of equity). For more details see Investment Company Institute and the Securities Industry
Association (2005).
27See Investment Company Institute (2009a).
28Since some of the reports produced by the ICI are released on a yearly basis, the e⁄ects of the recent ￿nancial crisis
already appear in their latest statistics, and by the end of 2008, these investment companies managed $10:3 trillion, down
from the $13 trillion reported for 2007. In 2008, investors withdrew $234 billion from stock mutual funds ($152 billion out
of the domestic and the remaining $82 billion out of foreign stock funds), which also re￿ ects the large drop in stock prices.
29For more on this survey, see Investment Company Institute (2009b).
30Agents face two decisions about their portfolio allocation; they decide whether to enter the stock market and how
much to hold of each type of asset.While it would be of interest to analyze the share held of such assets, due to the lack of
17The ownership equation estimated for an asset I is such that:




Controls for Wealth, Age, Education,
Demographics, Income variation,




+￿m ￿ (Information Acquisition variable)
where I = Foreign, Domestic, Indirect or Equity
k = number of control variables
m = number of information acquisition variables.
To control for household wealth, I include the logarithms of total assets (￿Assets￿ ), and income
(￿Income￿ ). To control for other types of investments, I add the logarithm of the net value of household
business (￿Business￿ ), and the logarithm of the total value of debt holdings (￿Debt￿ ). Household
indebtedness is mostly related to housing and opting to invest in the housing market can drive agents
out of stocks, if agents have to opt between ￿nancial and non￿nancial investments.31 Having a business
enterprise can not only change agents￿risk-taking pro￿le, but also compete directly with the allocation
of wealth across di⁄erent types of investment. Therefore, the variable for business wealth tries to
capture background risks agents may face. If there is a positive correlation between stock returns and
returns to investment, one expects a negative relation between the value of the business wealth and
stock ownership.32
To control for age and year, I include the household head age (￿Age￿ ) and its square (￿Age2￿ ),
and dummies for the di⁄erent years excluding 1998, ￿2001￿ , ￿2004￿and ￿2007￿ . Ameriks and Zeldes
(2004) highlight that it is not possible to separately identify age, time, and cohort e⁄ects, since, by
construction, at a time t, a person born in year b is x years old, and hence, x = t ￿ b. I follow Heaton
and Lucas (2000) and abstract from cohort e⁄ects by only adding year and age variables.
I include dummy variables for households headed by female (￿Female￿ ) or headed by a married
individual (￿Married￿ ). As for race characteristics, I include a dummy for self-reporting Hispanic
(￿Hispanic￿ ). To control for education, I include dummies for households whose head does not have
high school diploma (￿No high school￿ ) and those with at least a college degree (￿College￿ ), omitting
the intermediate case. To capture income variability, I include dummies for households headed by
a self-employed person (￿Self-employed￿ ), or retired (￿Retired￿ ). I also add a dummy variable to
measure income uncertainty (￿ICertain￿ ), which re￿ ects an answer to the dichotomous question: ￿At
this time, do you have a good idea of what your income for next year will be?￿Finally, to control for risk
characteristics, I include a self-reported measure of risk aversion (￿Risk aversion￿ ) which corresponds
detailed information about indirect holdings, I instead focus my analysis on the entry decision. In principle, these decisions
can be made jointly or separately. The household may opt to hold the asset only if the share invested is at its optimal
level, and hence, entering the asset market and the share to be held comprise the same decision problem. If this is the
case, a censored estimation such as a Tobin regression should be considered as the estimation process (see Tobin 1958).
The literature in household ￿nance, however, vastly documents a two-step decision on equity ownership and share held,
and for this case, ownership should be modeled separately from the share held and a Heckman estimation method is more
appropriate (see Heckman 1979).
31Chetty and Szeidl (2010) look at the e⁄ects of housing on portfolio choice.
32See Footnote 22 for references.
18to households￿answer to the question: ￿How much risk are you willing to take on a scale from 1 (take
substantial ￿nancial risk) to 4 (not willing to take any risk)?￿
The decision to hold each type of asset ￿ the entry decision ￿ can be a⁄ected by other factors
and entry costs, such as information acquisition. To control for information, I add a dummy variable
for whether households report the Internet as an information source when shopping for investments
(￿Internet￿ ), which corresponds to agents￿answer to the question: ￿What sources of information do
you (and your family) use to make decisions about saving and investments?￿The ￿Internet￿dummy
variable attains a value of 1 if the Internet was one of the sources, and zero otherwise. In Section 4, I
discuss the role of other sources of information.
3.1 Estimation results
Tables 7 and 8 show the benchmark regression results for foreign and domestic holdings, and for indirect
and equity holdings, respectively. In each table, standard deviations are reported in parentheses, next
to their respective coe¢ cients.33
The ￿rst two columns of Table 7 present the probit estimation results for ownership of foreign stocks,
while the last two columns show the equivalent results for ownership of domestic stocks.
For both regressions, the levels of income and assets have a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect, while the
business and debt levels have negative and signi￿cant e⁄ects. As expected, con￿rming the ￿ndings of
Figure 3, the hump shape in age does not hold true for these two regressions and instead, the regression
results show an inverse pattern for holdings of domestic stocks. Self-identifying as Hispanic correlates
negatively with holdings of both types of assets. The regressions also show that having a college degree
correlates positively with both holdings of stocks. As expected, risk aversion has a negative correlation
with holdings of domestic and foreign stocks, and in line with the evidence from Table 1 and the ICI
reports, the percentage of people holding domestic stocks decreases, in 2007.
Finally, having the Internet as a main source of information has a positive correlation with both
holdings of stocks, although this variable is only statistically signi￿cant for holdings of foreign stocks.
As Section 4 will discuss, this last result is robust to several changes in the regression speci￿cation.
Table 8 presents analogous results for equity holdings and indirect holdings of stocks. The regressions
show that the results are somewhat alike for these two classes of assets and are in line with the literature
predictions for equity holdings. The levels of assets and income have positive and signi￿cant e⁄ects,
while business and indebtness levels have negative e⁄ects. Age and education have the expected signs.
The hump shape for age e⁄ects is signi￿cant for indirect holdings, while more years of education have
a positive correlation with indirect and equity holdings. The risk aversion coe¢ cient is negative and
signi￿cant, and 2007 shows a decrease in stock holdings. Finally, the information acquisition variables
33For dealing with missing observations in the survey data, a multiple imputation procedure yielding ￿ve values for each
missing value is used to approximate the distribution of the missing data. The individual imputation is made by drawing
repeatedly from an estimate of the conditional distribution of the data. This implies that the number of observations in the
full data set is ￿ve times the actual number of respondents, for each year. The SCF documentation suggests two possible
ways of dealing with these replications in regressions: averaging the dependent and independent values across implicates,
or multiplying their standard errors by the square root of ￿ve. The former procedure is preferable if one is interested in
regression analysis. The documentation provided with the data includes a code that accounts for any biases generated by
the imputation method. In this paper, for all regressions reported, I apply their coding to the data to obtain the corrected
standard deviations. In unreported results, I also implement the second method and the results are not changed.
19Table 7: Regression Results - Foreign and Domestic Holdings of Stocks
Foreign Stocks Domestic Stocks
Constant -7.446*** (1.123) -2.874*** (0.667)
Assets 0.377*** (0.077) 0.312*** (0.05)
Income 0.163** (0.067) 0.099* (0.053)
Business -0.106*** (0.032) -0.082*** (0.024)
Debt -0.076** (0.036) -0.011 (0.026)
Age 0.025 (0.033) -0.053** (0.023)
Age2 0 (0) 0** (0)
Married -0.005 (0.204) -0.059 (0.137)
Female 0.398 (0.259) -0.326* (0.191)
Hispanic -0.824*** (0.259) -0.677*** (0.227)
No High School 0.189 (0.402) -0.328 (0.212)
College 0.401*** (0.155) 0.234*** (0.086)
Self-employed 0.157 (0.142) -0.141 (0.086)
Retired 0.042 (0.212) 0.09 (0.207)
ICertain 0.255* (0.142) -0.092 (0.078)
Risk aversion -0.322*** (0.077) -0.199*** (0.048)
2001 0.067 (0.161) 0.036 (0.104)
2004 -0.238 (0.16) -0.015 (0.106)
2007 0.025 (0.15) -0.272** (0.107)
Internet 0.347** (0.137) 0.127 (0.087)
R-squared 0.231 0.131
The table reports coe¢ cients and standard deviation estimates from two sep-
arate probit models of ownership of foreign and domestic stocks for U.S.
households in the 1998, 2001, 2004, and 2007 Surveys of Consumer Finances.
Coe¢ cients followed by *** are signi￿cant at 1%, ** are signi￿cant at 5%
level, andcoe¢ cients followed by * are signi￿cant at 10% level. The Survey of
Consumer Finances implements a multiple imputation procedure to correct
for missing data, and hence, standard errors are adjusted by averaging the
dependent and independent values across implicates. All data are weighted.
20Table 8: Regression Results - Indirect and total Equity Holdings of stocks
Indirect Holdings Equity Holdings
Constant -6.915*** (0.741) -6.348*** (0.776)
Assets 0.325*** (0.06) 0.406*** (0.066)
Income 0.288*** (0.057) 0.317*** (0.064)
Business -0.113*** (0.033) -0.136*** (0.038)
Debt 0.009 (0.029) 0 (0.031)
Age 0.065*** (0.023) 0.017 (0.024)
Age2 -0.001*** (0) 0 (0)
Married 0.152 (0.128) 0.115 (0.137)
Female -0.137 (0.164) -0.143 (0.171)
Hispanic -0.12 (0.199) -0.211 (0.198)
No High School -0.494*** (0.185) -0.518*** (0.183)
College 0.215** (0.087) 0.166* (0.094)
Self-employed -0.417*** (0.092) -0.451*** (0.1)
Retired -0.341 (0.21) -0.178 (0.243)
ICertain 0.176** (0.08) 0.134 (0.084)
Risk aversion -0.243*** (0.051) -0.309*** (0.056)
2001 0.069 (0.12) 0.038 (0.124)
2004 0.026 (0.117) -0.013 (0.127)
2007 -0.222** (0.11) -0.258** (0.118)
Internet 0.199** (0.101) 0.139 (0.114)
R-squared 0.229 0.256
The table reports coe¢ cients and standard deviation estimates from two sep-
arate probit models of ownership of indirect and total stock onwership for U.S.
households in the 1998, 2001, 2004, and 2007 Surveys of Consumer Finances.
Coe¢ cients followed by *** are signi￿cant at 1%, ** are signi￿cant at 5%
level, andcoe¢ cients followed by * are signi￿cant at 10% level. The Survey of
Consumer Finances implements a multiple imputation procedure to correct
for missing data, and hence, standard errors are adjusted by averaging the
dependent and independent values across implicates. All data are weighted.
21show a positive sign for both regressions but are only signi￿cant for indirect holdings of stocks.
While the regression estimates in both tables present most of the results in line with the previous
literature and similar across di⁄erent regressors, some new features are worth highlighting. First, this
set of results points to the role of information and risk aversion in determining agents￿participation in
stock markets. Besides education as a proxy for information, these regressions show that having the
Internet as a main source of information when deciding on investment opportunities correlates positively
with all types of stock holdings but have signi￿cant results for foreign holdings (and indirect holdings)
of stocks only. Second, the results also highlight the role of risk aversion in all four regressions, with
negative and statistically signi￿cant coe¢ cients for all regressions. While the size of probit coe¢ cients
are not easily interpreted, unreported results show that the marginal e⁄ects of risk aversion are the
smallest for foreign holdings of stocks, which is in line the predictions of Table 4.
4 Robustness
4.1 Joint decision
A ￿rst natural concern about the estimated results is that households￿participation decisions are not
independent, and hence, coe¢ cient estimates could be biased if one does not allow for correlation
between error terms. Bertaut and Starr-McCluer (2002) and Christellis and Georgarakos (2009) raise
this possibility when looking at the choice among di⁄erent ￿nancial assets and show these error terms
to be correlated. If this is the case, it is preferable to estimate the regressions jointly instead of running
separate regressions.
I test this hypothesis by jointly estimating the entry decision on domestic and foreign direct stock
markets. In particular, I estimate a bivariate probit regression (￿biprobit￿ ) on the ownership decision of
domestic and foreign stocks and present the results in Table 9. The Wald test for independent equations
presents strong evidence for a joint decision on entering foreign and domestic stock markets. The
residuals from a joint decision of holding domestic and foreign stocks are highly correlated, indicating
that the results of the joint estimation are preferable from the separate probit ones. The estimated
coe¢ cients, however, con￿rm the results on Tables 7 and 8.34
4.2 The role of wealth
Figures 1 and 2 show that participation in stock markets is highly concentrated at the high percentiles of
the wealth distribution, especially for foreign stock holdings. This concentration indicates that control-
ling for wealth is very important, and that at lower percentiles of wealth there is a large concentration
of nonholders (value zero for the dependent variable).
While the regressions of Tables 7 and 8 already control for wealth variables, it is unavoidable to
question if the strong e⁄ects of wealth on agents￿holding decisions, and its correlation to informational
variables can bias the regression results. In particular, households who have high level of wealth (in
34I also estimate a multivariate probit (￿mvprobit￿ ) testing for the joint ownership decision of direct holdings of foreign
and domestic stocks and indirect holdings of stocks. The coe¢ cients and signi￿cance results are mostly unchanged. The
estimation results point toward a joint decision on the ownership of foreign and domestic stocks, and of domestic and
indirect holdings, but no correlation between ownership of foreign and indirect holdings.
22Table 9: Regression Results - Biprobit
Foreign Domestic
Constant -6.919*** (1.036) -2.798*** (0.664)
Assets 0.299*** (0.066) 0.307*** (0.049)
Income 0.147** (0.065) 0.09* (0.053)
Business -0.087*** (0.029) -0.081*** (0.024)
Debt -0.065** (0.033) -0.009 (0.026)
Age 0.034 (0.033) -0.052** (0.023)
Age2 0 (0) 0** (0)
Married 0.119 (0.209) -0.046 (0.136)
Female 0.463* (0.263) -0.32* (0.188)
Hispanic -0.771*** (0.24) -0.673*** (0.226)
No High School 0.169 (0.381) -0.337 (0.211)
College 0.421*** (0.15) 0.241*** (0.086)
Self-employed 0.197 (0.132) -0.139 (0.086)
Retired -0.021 (0.212) 0.112 (0.204)
ICertain 0.202 (0.132) -0.087 (0.077)
Risk aversion -0.244*** (0.071) -0.19*** (0.048)
2001 0.052 (0.152) 0.016 (0.103)
2004 -0.24 (0.154) 0.112 (0.204)
2007 0.202 (0.132) -0.284*** (0.106)
Internet 0.284** (0.132) 0.124 (0.086)
Wald test of independent equations: rho=0: chi2 = 1201.7
Prob > chi2 = 0.000
The table reports coe¢ cients and standard deviation estimates from a bi-
variate probit model of ownership of foreign and domestic stocks for U.S.
households in the 1998, 2001, 2004, and 2007 Surveys of Consumer Finances.
Coe¢ cients followed by *** are signi￿cant at 1%, ** are signi￿cant at 5%
level, andcoe¢ cients followed by * are signi￿cant at 10% level. The Survey of
Consumer Finances implements a multiple imputation procedure to correct
for missing data, and hence, standard errors are adjusted by averaging the
dependent and independent values across implicates. All data are weighted.
23housing, business, or other asset classes) are also holders of foreign stocks, and if this correlation is
large enough, the coe¢ cients estimated in the benchmark regressions of Tables 7 and 8 can be biased.
Hence, to further control for wealth and disentangle the e⁄ects of informational variables, I re-estimate
the regressions of Tables 7 and 8 while restricting the sample across each of the 10 wealth deciles and
at the top 5 percentile of wealth distribution.
For all cases, the role of the Internet persists when the dependent variable is foreign stock holdings,
and is still not signi￿cant for domestic holdings of stocks. In particular, when restricting the wealth
at the top 10% of the wealth distribution, most of the results are qualitatively unchanged, with the
majority of the variables keeping their previously estimated sign, although some become insigni￿cant
or only signi￿cant at 10%. However, the e⁄ect of consulting the Internet remains unchanged only for
foreign holdings.35
For indirect holdings, most of the variables keep the previously estimated signs and their statistical
signi￿cance remains at least at 10%. Once more, however, ￿Internet￿loses its signi￿cance as it does
for domestic holdings. If I further restrict the sample to households who have at least a college degree
and are at the top 10% of the wealth distribution, the results are similar to the ones obtained in the
previous exercise. In all cases, the sign and statistical signi￿cance of "Internet" is only sustained for
foreign asset holdings. I report these results in the Appendix, which includes the regression estimates
after restricting the sample to the top 10% of wealth distribution.36
The previous exercise highlights the strong and robust e⁄ects of information in holdings of foreign
stocks, in addition to providing a ￿rst test for the possible biasing e⁄ects of the correlation between
wealth and the remainder variables. As an additional robustness test, I re-estimate the regressions of
Tables 7 and 8, dropping each wealth variable at a time, and all of them altogether (namely ￿Assets￿ ,
￿Income￿ , ￿Business￿ , and ￿Debt￿ ). The results are qualitatively unchanged. Despite the absence of
these variables and small changes in the size of coe¢ cients, their signs and statistical signi￿cance are
unchanged. For brevity, I omit a table with these results.
Together with the above described results, the sample characteristics help to conclude that endo-
geneity of wealth is likely minor in this paper. In particular, evidence from Section 2.2 shows that
agents tend to start their investments with indirect holdings and then migrate to direct holdings, and
hence, for this sample, households who hold foreign stocks are most probably already wealthy.
Finally, the benchmark regressions of Section 3 include the logarithm of business wealth. Business
owners already face risks in their investments, and if business returns are positively correlated to stock
returns, one expects a negative correlation between the value of their business and holdings of stocks.
In fact, the results of all regressions show that this intuition veri￿es. However, it is worth noting that
the ￿Business￿variable corresponds to the logarithm of the value of household business, hence, if the
household does not own a business or if the net value of its business is zero, the logarithm of the business
value does not exist. Therefore, in practice, by including this variable, the sample is restricted to those
35Given the large concentration of nonholders at low levels of wealth distribution, the regression can only be re-estimated
for wealth levels above the 50% decile.
36When looking at equity holdings, the household ￿nance literature constrains their sample between the 1
st and the
99
th percentiles to account for possible outliers. In this paper, since the bulk of direct holdings of stocks are located at
the top percentiles of the wealth distribution, such sample limitation eliminates a substantial share of stock holders, in
particular foreign ones. Hence, I opt to present the benchmark results without this restriction on the sample. My results
are, however, unchanged if the 1
st and the 99
th percentiles of wealth are removed.
24who own a positive value of private business (and hence, are possibly wealthier). To overcome this sample
restriction, I look at an alternative estimation that includes instead a dummy variable accounting for
business ownership that is 1 if the household owns a business and zero otherwise. The results show that
information is still an important variable in determining foreign stock holdings, qualitatively replicating
the results for the foreign holdings regression. In addition, the e⁄ect of the ￿Internet￿becomes positive
and statistically signi￿cant for the other classes of stock investment. However, this newly obtained
signi￿cance for domestic stock holdings is not robust to several tests, such as restricting the sample
across wealth deciles or including other proxies of information. Finally, Heaton and Lucas (2000) make
the case for the value of private business and its correlation with stock holdings, and the regressions of
Tables 7 and 8 con￿rm their predictions.
4.3 Alternative information variables
The SCF is rich enough to provide many variables that could a⁄ect ownership. Although some of these
variables are promising in their expected results, some are not available for all years of the survey or
are not signi￿cant across all the di⁄erent regressions estimated. As an example of the latter case, the
SCF asks participants about their expectations for the economy and their expectations for interest
rates movements. However, none of these variables are signi￿cant in any of the regressions estimated
or change the e⁄ects of the remaining regressors.
The SCF also provides several proxies for information acquisition variables. Tables 5 and 6 list
some of these variables, namely the number of times the head of the household talked to his/her bro-
ker to change their portfolio; the amount of shopping around for investments; and additional sources
of information such as newspapers, friends, ￿nancial planners, bankers, and brokers. As a robustness
check, I re-estimate the same regressions in Table 7 using all these alternative measures of information
acquisition to replace the Internet. The results do not change qualitatively. While ￿Times￿and ￿News-
paper￿are statistically signi￿cant for foreign holdings of stocks, the same variables are not signi￿cant
for domestic holdings except for ￿Newspaper￿ , which is also statistically signi￿cant at 10% for domestic
holdings. The remaining variables ￿Broker￿ , ￿Banker￿and ￿Fin. Planner￿have the expected sign but
are not statistically signi￿cant. Finally, I also test the same regressions including all information proxies
at once. This results in once more having "Internet" signi￿cant only for foreign holdings. Results are
also robust to limiting the sample at wealth deciles as described in the previous subsection.
4.4 Alternative estimation methods
The results of this paper look at the correlation between informational variables and stock holdings,
but do not account for causation. Hence, it is possible that households who hold foreign stocks acquire
more information, or vice versa, that households who are better informed hold foreign stocks. To brie￿ y
explore causation, I perform a propensity score matching for holdings of foreign stocks when controlling
for usage of the Internet as a main source of information. In particular, I re-estimate the benchmark
regressions of Tables 7 and 8, restricting the sample to the common support obtained from regressing
￿Internet￿ on the same independent variables of the benchmark regressions. The results are again
unchanged.
25As for the estimation method, the dependent variables show several nonholders. This skewness on
the distribution suggests testing for other estimation methods such as logit or cloglog. Hence, I estimate
logits and cloglogs instead of probits and replicate all robustness checks, and obtain unchanged results.
Finally, as reported in Section 2.2, the ICI publications reveal that a large share of investors start
their ￿nancial investments through investment funds and later migrate to individual stock holdings.
Since the SCF is not a panel, such inference is not possible. Nevertheless, to she some light about the
e⁄ects of indirect holdings, I reestimate the biprobit regression of Table 9 while adding indirect stocks
ownership as an explanatory variable. In fact, this variable is positive and statistically signi￿cant for
both domestic and foreign holdings. In addition, the sign and magnitudes of the remaining variables do
not change. The results of this regression are presented in the Appendix.
The evidence that information is an important variable for households￿decisions regarding ownership
of foreign stocks is con￿rmed by the benchmark regressions and the robustness checks. In addition, the
lower participation in foreign stock markets suggests that households may face an entry cost when
deciding to invest in this market.37 The section that follows introduces a model that tries to capture
what role these two features, information and entry cost, play in explaining investors￿participation
in foreign stock markets and attentiveness. The model builds an interpretation for some of the data
features while controlling for household demographic characteristics.
5 Costly Information
Abel et al. (2007) build a model where consumers must pay a cost to observe the value of their wealth
and to update their portfolio of investments. Hence, consumers/investors optimally choose to update
their information set infrequently and to consume from a transaction account between observation
periods. The authors show that even a cost as small as 0:01% of wealth is enough to generate an eight-
month decision interval. I depart from their work in two directions: I ￿rst introduce foreign stocks to
agents￿portfolio choice, and next I discuss the roles of information and an entry cost in such market.
5.1 The model
In the model, consumers hold wealth in an investment portfolio, and in a riskless liquid asset used for
transactions. If the consumer decides to enter the stock market, the investment portfolio is composed of
a riskless bond and risky stocks, domestic and foreign. To observe the value of her wealth and portfolio









where c stands for consumption, 0 < ￿ 6= 1 is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution,
and ￿ > 0 is the intertemporal rate of discount.
The investment portfolio is composed of a riskless bond that pays a constant rate of return r > 0,
and of non-dividend-paying domestic and foreign stocks with prices Dt and Ft, respectively. Stock prices
37The presence of participation costs is also found by Chirstelis and Georgaralos (2009), who investigate foreign asset
ownership using the SCF data, and compare the decision of holding stocks, bonds and liquid accounts. Their results point































and Z is a Wiener process, ￿d and ￿f are returns on domestic and foreign stocks, respectively, and ￿
is the variance-covariance matrix of stock returns.38
The consumer can observe the investment portfolio by paying a fraction ￿, 0 ￿ ￿ < 1, of the
contemporaneous value of the wealth.39 She can only withdraw funds from the portfolio if she observes
its value. Hence, to ￿nance consumption within observation periods, the consumer also holds a riskless
liquid asset that pays rL, with 0 ￿ rL < r.
Let tj, j = 1;2;3;:::, be the times at which the consumer observes the value of her portfolio. At
time tj, she chooses: (i) the next ￿observation date￿ , tj+1 = tj +￿; (ii) the amount of the riskless liquid





￿d, and foreign stocks, ￿f.






and since rL < r, when observation time arrives, the amount held in the riskless asset will have reached
zero, i.e., Xt￿ = 0. At this time, the consumer pays the observation cost, ￿, and observes the value of
her wealth that equals:





where R(tj;tj + ￿) is the gross rate of return to investment from time tj and tj +￿, and R(tj;tj) = 1.
For simplicity, I follow Abel et al. (2007) and also assume that a portfolio manager continuously
rebalances the portfolio to maintain a ￿xed proportion of assets invested in stocks.40 In this case, the
38I follow Abel et al. (2007) and assume constant return and volatility of returns. Rossi (2010) studies a case with time
variant returns but abstracts from alternative risky assets.
39Assuming the observation cost as a fraction of the value of the portfolio allows one to obtain a closed-form solution
for the consumer￿ s optimization problem. Gabaix and Laibson (2002) instead assume the observation cost to be constant
in terms of utility and obtain an approximate solution for the consumer￿ s problem.
40Assuming continuous rebalancing substantially simpli￿es the solution. Du¢ e and Sun (1990) work on a version of
the model with transaction costs and instead assume that interest payments are reinvested in bonds and dividends are
reinvested in equity.









I solve the consumer￿ s problem in four steps: the consumption choice between two consecutive
observation dates; the choice of riskless assets and the share invested in stocks; and two ￿nal steps that
uncover the value function and the optimal observational frequency. Proposition 1 highlights the main
results from the model￿ s solution. The Appendix provides detailed derivations, proposition proofs and
additional results.
Proposition 1 The solution to the consumer￿ s problem implies the following:
a. The value function is such that
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(1￿￿)
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5.2 The participation decision ￿entry-cost model
While the model of Section 5.1 predicts that it is optimal for all agents to always invest in stocks,
empirical evidence points to a large fraction of households out of the stock market.
Hence, I look at agents￿ decisions to enter the domestic and foreign stock markets. I consider
two cases; ￿rst I look at the decision to enter the domestic stock market, when foreign stocks are not
available, and next I consider the case where agents already invest in domestic stocks and decide whether
to also invest in foreign ones.42
41I follow Abel et al. (2007) and assume both ! > 0 and ￿ > 0 to obtain a unique solution.
42The empirical evidence shows that it is almost never the case that agents invest directly in foreign stocks but not in
domestic ones.
28To account for the nonparticipation observed in the household data, I assume that in addition to
the updating cost ￿, consumers pay a one-time entry cost K out of their initial wealth to enter the
stock market. This entry cost represents ￿nancial costs and time spent learning about investment
opportunities, acquiring information about risks and returns, and any type of brokerage commissions.43
I consider the two cases described above and assess the two minimum costs that would drive agents out
of the domestic market (Kd), or out of the foreign market (Kf) once they already invest in domestic
stocks.
The exercise, hence, comprises the comparison of three value functions: the ￿rst arises from the
case where agents do not invest in stocks; the second corresponds to the value function attained by
the investor who only invests in domestic stocks; and the third is the value function of a investor that
invests in both domestic and foreign stocks.
5.3 No participation in stock markets
If agents opt not to enter the stock market and hold all their wealth in riskless liquid assets, their overall
rate of return equals rL. From the de￿nitions of ￿; ! and ￿ (￿) in Proposition 1, the non-entry decision
implies ￿ = ! and ￿ (￿) = !￿￿.44 Hence, the value function, at time 0, equals




5.4 Participation in domestic stock markets only
Now assume agents can also invest in domestic stocks. For doing so, they pay an entry cost K out of
their ￿rst-period wealth. I then ask what minimum value of the entry cost, Kd, would drive agents out
of the domestic market.
To answer this question, I exclude foreign stocks from the model. The solution of such a model
is similar to the one obtained in Proposition 1 and replicates exactly the one extensively described in
Abel et al. (2007). Since most of the equations of models both with and without foreign stocks are
isomorphic, to refer to the case where agents invest only in domestic stocks, I add a subscript ￿d￿to all
variables that correspond to this case.45
Hence, when consumers invest only in domestic stocks, the value function, the optimal share invested
43Jones (2002) documents a large decline in such commissions charged by brokerage ￿rms.
44Recall that under the assumptions imposed in the parameters of Section 5.1, it is optimal for the investor to enter the
stock market and invest in both types of stocks. It is also optimal to observe and update the portfolio at equally spaced
points of time.
45The following equations can be obtained by eliminating foreign stocks from the model presented in Section 5.1. Refer
to Abel et al. (2007) for a full description of their solution.
29in stocks, and the optimal inattention are such that











































Therefore, the minimum Kd needed to drive agents out of the domestic stock market equals the
value functions of consumers who invest in domestic stocks (equation 8 after paying the entry cost) and
consumers who do not invest in stocks at all (equation 7), i.e.,
￿d (￿)


























5.5 Participation in foreign stock market
The empirical evidence shows that an even smaller share of agents choose to invest in foreign stocks,
even among those who already invest in domestic stocks. Hence, I ask what would be the minimum
entry cost, Kf, that would drive agents out of the foreign market, once they already invest in domestic
stocks. For this case, I assume agents pay no entry cost to invest in domestic stocks, but to also invest
in foreign markets they pay an extra entry cost. The minimum entry cost Kf that would drive agents
out of foreign markets is obtained by equating the value functions in equations (3) and (8), yielding


























Note that when there is no observation cost, ￿ = 0, the investor can update at every period with
no cost. In this case, the investor optimally chooses to do so, and from the de￿nition of ￿, one obtains
￿ = 0 ) ^ ￿ = 0. In this case, we are back to the classic Merton (1969) model where agents have no
cost of observing or adjusting their portfolio and choose the share invested in stocks to be constant and
30independent of wealth. The optimal share invested in each type of stock is same as derived in his model
when generalized for many assets. In addition, since in the absence of updating costs it is optimal to
invest in both stocks, the minimum costs Kf and Kd are equal to unit.
5.6 Analytical results: optimal level of inattention
The two models above, including and excluding the option to invest in foreign stocks, allows for a
comparison between model-implied optimal levels of inattention.
Proposition 2 If ￿ > 1, the (approximately) optimal level of inattention is smaller once foreign stock
holdings are introduced into the model, i.e.,
^ ￿￿ < ^ ￿￿
d:
Proposition 2 shows that the introduction of foreign stocks into the model implies that consumers
update their portfolios more frequently (assuming ￿ > 1). Intuitively, consumers who invest both
in foreign and domestic stocks, tilt their portfolio toward risky assets, and hence, despite the cost of
updating their information set, these risk averse investors will update more frequently. As Table 6 shows,
this theoretical result also has empirical support; households who hold foreign stocks more frequently
talk to their broker to update their portfolio.
Section 5.7 complements the model predictions by calibrating the parameters and drawing inference
from the relation between such parameters, the cost Kf, and the optimal information adjustment
process.
5.7 Quantitative results: level of inattention and ￿xed costs
To parameterize the model and quantify the e⁄ects of foreign stocks on optimal inattention ￿ and Kf,
I follow Abel et al. (2007); and assume ￿ = 4, ￿ = 0:01, rL = 0:01, and r = 0:02. To calibrate for asset
returns and correlations, I use data from Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) which provide
stock market returns for di⁄erent countries and regions besides the United States.46
For all indices, I use before-tax returns on stocks at a monthly frequency, which are further an-
nualized. In particular for the U.S., I obtain return and volatility of the S&P500, that correspond
respectively to ￿d = 0:086 and ￿2
d = (0:17)
2. Under these assumptions for return and volatility of
domestic stocks, the optimal inattention predicted by a version of the model with only domestic stocks
(as in Section 5.4 and Abel et al. (2007)) equals ^ ￿￿
d = 0:47 years, and the share invested in stocks equals
0:43. Under this version of the model, the entry cost necessary to drive agents out of the domestic stock
market is Kd = 0:78; i.e., to justify nonparticipation in domestic stock markets, the minimum entry
cost needed reaches 78% of agents￿initial wealth.
Once consumers have the option to also invest in foreign stocks, one has to make a stand about
returns and volatilities of such a market and about the covariance of foreign stocks with domestic ones.
As a proxy for foreign returns, I look at several foreign stock indices: the "EAFE" includes returns to
46In particular, I use gross total returns of MSCI Global Standard Indices, which aggregate large and mid-capitalized
company returns from January 1970 to January 2010.
31stocks in Europe, Australasia and Far East;47 "Europe" corresponds to stocks in developed economies
in Europe;48 "Japan" and "Canada" are composed of stocks from these two countries, respectively; and
"Emerging Markets" includes stocks from emerging market economies.49
Table 10 reports annualized logarithmic returns, volatilities and covariances for foreign country
indices underneath the column "Parameters". Under "Model Predictions", the table also provides the
results obtained for the optimal inattention ^ ￿￿, the minimum entry cost Kf, and the implied shares
invested in each type of index, ￿d, ￿f.
Table 10: Illustrative Calculations
Parameters Model Predictions
￿f ￿2





2 0:016 0:37 0:24 0:61
Europe 0:101 (0:175)
2 0:018 0:36 0:25 0:67
Japan 0:093 (0:217)
2 0:012 0:40 0:17 0:38
Canada 0:097 (0:203)
2 0:024 0:43 0:09 0:43
EmergingM: 0:126 (0:249)
2 0:025 0:39 0:19 0:49
Con￿rming Proposition 2, Table 10 shows that inattention is smaller when agents also invest in
foreign stocks as the column labeled as ^ ￿￿ indicates ￿agents who also invest in foreign stocks optimally
choose to update their portfolios at a higher frequency. The column labeled Kf shows that when
compared to Kd = 0:78, the minimum entry cost needed to drive agents out of the foreign market, once
they already invest in domestic stocks, is relativelly smaller but possibly as large as 25%.
The large number attained by Kd is in line with the equity premium puzzle predictions. The ￿nance
literature showed that to obtain a smaller entry cost Kd, this type of model should either include other
sources of investment frictions, or include a high level of risk aversion.50 The possibly high entry cost
needed to drive agents out of the foreign stock market, however, is an intriguing new fact, given the
substantial nonparticipation in foreign markets.
To test for the sensitivity of the results, in the next section, I vary some of the main parameters and
observe the e⁄ects on the entry cost and the inattention levels.
47The MSCI EAFE Index consists of the following 21 developed countries￿indices: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Den-
mark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
48MSCI Europe Index consists of the following 16 developed countries￿indices: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United
Kingdom.
49The MSCI Emerging Markets Index consists of the following 22 emerging market indices: Brazil, Chile, China,
Colombia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Peru, Philippines,
Poland, Russia, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey.
50See Mehra and Prescott (1985) and Mankiw and Zeldes (1991).
325.7.1 Sensitivity analysis
Table 10 shows that the entry cost needed to drive agents out of foreign stock markets once they already
invest in domestic stocks is much smaller than Kd = 0:78, and ranges from 9% for Canadian stocks to
25% for European stocks in the examples above. The inattention level also varies from 0.36 to 0.46 for
the same stock indices.
In this section I test for the sensitivity of these results by assuming stock returns are the same for





, the updating cost (￿), and risk aversion (￿). This venue builds on the ￿ndings of
Calvet et al. (2007), who show that agents invest ine¢ ciently, obtaining returns that are smaller than
those indicated by stock indices. In addition, Table 10 shows that the average returns on the di⁄erent
stock indices are generally not statistically di⁄erent from each other, and hence, assuming equal returns
in both foreign and domestic stock markets does not seem as a big stretch.




2, while varying the asset correlation, ￿df, from ￿0:9 to 0:9, the updating cost, ￿, from 0:01%
to 2%, and the risk aversion, ￿, from 2 to 6.51 In addition to the results for optimal inattention and
minimum entry cost, for ease of comparison each chart of Figure 4 also marks the points that correspond
to the benchmark parameter choices, i.e., ￿ = 0:01%, ￿ = 4 and ￿df = 0:018.
The ￿rst two charts in the top panel of Figure 4 show that while the correlation of assets ranges
from ￿0:9 to 0:9, the gains from diversi￿cation reduce substantially, and when correlation is the same
as in the data, ￿df = 0:018 (marked as a point in both charts), the entry cost needed to drive agents
out of foreign stocks once they already invest in domestic ones drops by half, from 25% to 13%.
The middle panel of Figure 4 looks at the e⁄ects on ^ ￿￿ and Kf when varying ￿. Foreign stock
investors have to inform themselves not only about the domestic stock market but also about the
foreign market. Hence, in this exercise, I deviate slightly from the model by assuming that agents
who hold only domestic stocks pay ￿ = 0:01% of their portfolio value to update their information set,
and vary ￿ paid by investors who also hold foreign stocks.52 The two charts show that the larger the
updating cost (￿), the larger is the optimal inattention and the smaller is Kf. In addition, when both
foreign and domestic assets yield the same return and volatility, a 1% updating cost and an entry cost
of 1% of initial wealth are already enough to justify nonparticipation in foreign stock markets.
The theoretical literature presents little agreement on the level for the risk aversion parameter. While
several papers assume logarithmic utility (approximating ￿ to unity), several others assume larger values
for this parameter. The two charts in the bottom panel of Figure 4 test for the sensitivity of the results
to the risk aversion parameter. The risk-premium puzzle literature argues that the risk aversion needed
to justify the large nonparticipation in stock assets has to be quite large. This exercise sets asset returns
and volatilities equal to the the U.S. ones, and varies the risk aversion parameter ￿ from 2 to 6. The
charts show that the larger the risk aversion (larger ￿), the larger the optimal inattention. While this
may look counterintuitive at ￿rst, the positive relation comes from the e⁄ect of ￿ on the optimal share
51I set ￿df = 0:018, when varying ￿ and ￿.
52More speci￿cally, when building Kf, as in equation (10), one compares the value associated with holdings of domestic
stocks only with holdings of foreign ones. In this exercise, I am ￿xing the updating costs for domestic-only stock holders
(￿d in the numerator of the term in parentheses of equation 10), and varying the updating cost associated with holdings





























































































































































































































































Figure 4: Optimal inattention and minimum entry cost - Assuming equal returns and volatility
34held of assets. The larger the risk aversion, the smaller is the share of the portfolio held in stocks (both
foreign and domestic), and hence, agents update their information set less frequently.53 Finally, if risk
aversion is set at 5 instead of 4, the minimum entry cost ranges on the negative side, indicating that it
is not pro￿table to invest in foreign stocks.
6 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the household ￿nance participation puzzle literature by focusing on interna-
tional holdings of stocks. Participation in foreign stock markets is very limited and the recent literature
points to the role of information in determining investments in foreign assets. While the international
￿nance literature has focused on the share of foreign assets held on ￿nancial portfolios, this paper studies
the decision to invest in foreign stocks, that is, the participation decision.
Using the Survey of Consumer Finances, I show that holders of foreign stocks are substantially
wealthier, more educated, with a di⁄erent age pro￿le, and more sophisticated in their sources of in-
formation than domestic-only stock holders. These empirical results point toward the importance of
information in determining agents￿entry in foreign stock markets. To account for the two main features
of the data ￿low participation in foreign stock markets and higher attentiveness ￿the paper considers a
model where information is costly and investors decide whether to enter the domestic and foreign stock
markets. In the model, to update their information set investors pay a ￿xed cost out of their portfolio
value. In addition, to account for the costs of acquiring information, a version of the model also features
an entry cost to be paid in the ￿rst period by agents who invest in the stock market. The model predicts
agents optimally choosing to update their portfolio only infrequently, at equally spaced points in time.
More importantly, agents that invest in foreign stocks update their information set more frequently.
After calibrating the model to match returns and volatility for the U.S. economy and di⁄erent foreign
stock investments, the model predicts that, once agents already invest in domestic stock markets, the
minimum cost that would drive investors out of foreign stock markets can be fairly small (depending
on the model calibration), justifying the lack of participation in foreign markets. Both empirical and
theoretical results point to the importance of information in determining agents￿entry in foreign stock
markets.
The empirical evidence highlights the characteristics of holders of stocks, in particular foreign stocks.
While the equity holdings literature documents that equity holdings are increasing in wealth, increasing
in education, and hump-shaped in age, the empirical results of this paper show that participation in for-
eign stock markets is increasing in wealth, increasing in education, non hump-shaped in age, decreasing
but less sensitive to risk aversion, and increasing and more sensitive to information acquisition.
Among the caveats, I must emphasize that estimation results provide inference on the correlation
between di⁄erent variables and the entry decision, but they do not imply causation. It is possible that
more access to information drives households to enter the foreign stock market, or equally possible that
agents with a diversi￿ed portfolio search more for information. The propensity score matching results,
however, seem to point toward the ￿rst case. In addition, the data for this paper only includes households
53Notice that varying risk aversion also a⁄ects Kd, but the e⁄ects are smaller than on Kf. Kd ranges from 0.91 to 0.72
when I vary ￿ from 2 to 6.
35who hold stocks directly, and since the data show agents starting their stock investments through
investment funds, it is more likely that holders of foreign stocks in this sample are already wealthy,
supporting the case for an e⁄ect of information on foreign holdings and not the opposite. Nevertheless,
given my results pointing toward the importance of information, further analyzing causality e⁄ects
seems worth pursuing. A more complete and disaggregated description of household assets, particularly
of indirect holdings, could provide the tools for such analysis.
The calibrated model indicates the size of the entry cost needed to preclude agents from foreign stock
investments, and shows that the model-implied gains from diversi￿cation are highly dependent on the
calibration of main parameters. This paper relies on an entry cost to account for the low participation in
foreign stock markets. Other possible venues taken by the literature include the assumption of borrowing
constraints, transaction costs (as in Vissing-Jorgensen 2003), and background risks, in addition to
variations in participation costs and risk aversion levels.54 The results of Section 5.7 show that, indeed,
a combination of higher updating costs, risk aversion, and uncertainty about asset returns can bring
down the minimum cost needed to drive agents out of the foreign stocks markets. The model also
sets aside exchange rate risks by assuming agents can invest in foreign stocks that are traded in U.S.
markets. Introducing currency variation risk could bring the minimum entry cost even lower.
Finally, the model does not address life-cycle behavior such as the e⁄ects of age, education, wage
income, and background risks. The empirical evidence in the household ￿nance literature shows that
such variables are important in determining equity holdings.55 Hence, the model can be interpreted
as an analysis of inattention and entry costs when holding constant demographic characteristics, along
the same line as the regression presented in Section 4.2. Extending the model to test for such facts
appears to be a challenging and interesting path to pursue in order to contribute to the understanding
of participation in international stock markets.
54Heaton and Lucas (2000a;2000b) address background risk and its e⁄ects on portfolios.
55Bertaut and Starr-McCluer (2002) give empirical evidence about the e⁄ects of those variables.
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